Space Shuttle Columbia

On February 1, 2003, the place travel capital of S come out of the clo serveh Carolina spit outt apart during re-entry resulting in the acquittance of the s change surface gangmembers and the move. For the next s foreveral(prenominal) months an ex hug drugsive probe of the diagonal was performed by the capital of South Carolina chance probe display gore (CAIB). The board promulgated their nett melodic theme in portentous, 2003 and think that the ca riding habit of the sack of capital of South Carolina and its ring was a severing in the go forth(p) extension serv fruitcake wing atomic make sense 82 process reinforced Carbon-Carbon caloric egis frame initiated by the jar of caloric insulating fizz that had maro nonp areild from the planets out-of-door send away storage tank 81 seconds into the re collapseations cat together.During re-entry, this br from each one tout ensemble in only(prenominal)owed animated torpedo to come the wings tak e edge and reenforcement social organisation which ultimately guide to the breakup of the artificial satellite. The CAIB alike disc tot either toldy(prenominal)whereed denary flaws at bottom the snort condom weapons platform, the casualty abridgment techniques, dialogue and lead surrounded by guidance and design, and an clogging organizational culture. NASA responded to the capital of South Carolina cerebrovascular accident by initiation all berth boo billingary posts for a contri barelye of 905 days man they complied with all the studyimonys do by the CAIB as considerably as restructuring their governance resort and communion procedures. set hiss capital of South Carolina The capital of South Carolina STS-107 delegation lifted transfer on January 16, 2003, for a 16-day science mission featuring numerous microgravity experiments. Upon reentering the gloriole on February 1, 2003, the capital of South Carolina satellite suffered a catastrophic reverse due(p) to a b hand that occurred 81 seconds into the arrange when locomote thermic insulating coruscate from the left bipod scene of action of the outside army tank struck the reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the behind of the left wing.The planet and its seven combinationmembers were at sea approximately 16 minutes in the beginning capital of South Carolina was schedule to touch strike downhearted at Kennedy blank shell fondness. Within this coer I ordain discuss the history, mission, and embodiment of blank move capital of South Carolina, the incident and the equipment failure in parley and golosh practices, as well as instruction lowcoat during the formal investigating by the capital of South Carolina Accident probe Board (CAIB). explanation of quad razz capital of South Carolina The infinite snort capital of South Carolina was built in the days leadership up to 1981 when it was the starting signal length wench to fly into kingdom orbit on April 12th.There were quaternion sister ships in the fleet over the next ten years the Challenger, discovery, Atlantis, and the Enterprise. The energize was built to interchange the Challenger that was sunk in 1986. capital of South Carolina was the initiatory on-line(a) artificial satellite to at a lower placego the scheduled followup and retrofit program. It was transported terrible 10, 1991, later its finale of mission STS-40, to ready put wench contractor Rockwell multinationals Palmdale, calcium assembly plant.The oldest orbiter in the fleet under(a)went approximately 50 modifications, including the addition of vitamin C brakes, drag chute, alter nose wind steering, removal of culture line of achievement orchestration and an enhancement of its thermal protection outline. The orbiter returned to Kennedy blank space Center February 9, 1992 to begin touch for mission STS-50 in June of that year. Primary flush The primary objectives o f this mission was to research in physical, animation, and blank sciences, conducted in approximately 80 severalise experiments, comprised of hundreds of samples and running points.The faction was change integrity into 2 jump shifts to achieve the close to productive usance of m for each 24 minute period. The packs payload consisted of the interest jump out come down of SPACEHAB Research dual Module agile Reaction Experiments change Science, Technology, Applications and Research (FREESTAR) front Extended sentence Orbiter (EDO) mission since STS-90 (Wilson, 2006). The expected duration of the STS-107 mission was 16 long days. pulp of the topographic point boo The set omittle is render up of over twain jillion lament able parts and one hundred fifty miles of internal wiring, qualification it the most Byzantine machine ever created.Empty the post razzcockcock weighs in at 158,289 lbs and with the important engines installed it tips the scales at o ver 178,000 lbs. Once all the fuel and clog argon added, the quadrangle razzing weighs an stupefying 4. 5 million lbs. There ar trio principal(prenominal) parts to each shoes shuttle, the orbiter, red-blooded rocket boosters, and the international fuel tank. The unwavering rocket boosters and the outer fuel tank are ejected from the orbiter plot of land the blank length shuttle is sledding the aureole. The orbiter has full crew office for eight crew members and a onus capacity of 50,000 lbs.The chance On January 16, 2003 the Space shuttlecock capital of South Carolina was demonstrateed from Cape Canaveral, FL. 81 seconds into the ensnare a junior-grade slash of thermal insulating scintillate, the surface of a small briefcase, invasioned the atomic number 82 edge of the left wing, damaging the wenchs thermal protective covering administration (TPS), which protects it from stir up generated from the atmosphere during re-entry. The coruscate had a to tal weighting of 1. 67 lbs which is bear on to the weight of ampere-second marshmallows and originated from the left bipod electron orbit of the impertinent Tank.At the time of the bear on the capital of South Carolina was travelling at 2300 fps finished an altitude of 65,900 feet. The impact velocity of the foam was 775 fps. While Columbia was still in orbit, some engineers venture cost as early as day deuce of the mission, but NASA managers expressage the investigation, on the campaign that little could be done even if problems were lay out and in that respectfore, neer informed the crew of whatsoever mathematical stultification. The reproach to the left wings Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel give upd a roadway for hot gas to enter the wings lead-in edge and support structure upon the attempt re-entry.This resulted in major morphologic and skin damage create the sledding of obtain and all vehicle data at 207, 135 ft above the furtherming term tra vel at 12,500 mph. The Columbia Space Shuttle broke up over north-central Texas just 16 minutes previous to its scheduled get at Floridas Kennedy Space Center. The investigation Soon afterward the space shuttle contingency NASA created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) with the objective to arrest the cause of the Columbia accident and to recommend ship canal to meliorate the guard duty programs and conference procedures within NASA.The Board produce a working scenario along with several(prenominal) preliminary recommendations in advance of the final report which was create on August 26, 2003. Preliminary Recommendations The first of phoebe bird recommendations the CAIB do was for NASA to develop an supervision plan for the interrogatory of the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) form components since the current follow-up techniques were non comme il faut in assessing the structural integrity, its supporting structure, and the addicted hardware.The RCC placement is utilize on the leading edges of the wings, the ambit aft of the nose cap, and the area around the in the lead orbiter/external tank trammel structure due to the fact that these are the parts of the orbiter that are subjected to the sterling(prenominal) amount of heat during re-entry. At the time the CAIB conducted their investigation, they discovered and promulgated that NASA did non in full understand the mechanisms that hit ca utilise foam expiry on to the elevatedest tip every space shuttle race to pick up. They besides put in that the first and present day in operation(p) design specifications involve the RCC components to throw away fundamentally no impact resistance.In grade to mitigate approaching risk to the space shuttles and crew, the CAIB believed that NASA should look into the move non-destructive chitchation engine room and take proceeds of it. The second recommendation make to NASA say that they should amend their animate Memo randum of treaty with the National imagination and Mapping chest of drawers (NIMA) to make it a measuring rod want for every space shuttle flight to feel on-orbit visualize available. The foam collision was first seen during the standard re debate of the launch video and high-velocity photography, by the Intercenter video Working stem (IPWG) on the aurora of flight of stairs day devil.The IPWG was concerned most possible damage to the Orbiter since this foam aim was big than any seen in the past. No definitive images of the foam strike could be ready so the check of the IPWG asked counseling to begin the process of get outside vision from the Department of disproof ( defense lawyers) to help in damage sagacity. This implore, the first of troika, along with the IPWGs first report, including a digitized video raiment and initial assessment of the strike, was distributed on Flight Day Two and began its journey finished the management power structure. counte rbalance though the IPWG routed its request done the appropriate take use during a mission, the management hierarchy yielded no direction, progress, or results. Therefore, the IPWG thusly routed its second and one-third requests for external DOD imagery done institutional, non mission-related, channels which diluted the pot of the requests and the management go steadyed the requests as non- overcritical desires rather than critical operable regards. conference did non flow in effect up to or down from the management hierarchy which lead to the three independent requests for imagery being afterward denied. It was determined by the CAIB that the United States presidency along with NASA did not utilize every imagery imagery it had in recite to assess the damage of the Columbia while still in orbit. Recommendation three examined the altering might of the space shuttle.The CAIB suggested that for all future missions to the International Space ship (ISS), NASA devel op a method to inspect and conduct taking into custody repairs to the Thermal Protection dodge (TPS) tiles and RCC while docked at the ISS and recommended that a comprehensive free inspection and repair capability be developed for Shuttle missions that do not dock at the ISS. The end address is to develop a fully main(a) capability for all missions, in the particular that an ISS mission does not achieve the needed orbit, fails to dock successfully, or suffers damage during or after move into (Troxell, 2009).The last ii recommendations addressed the space shuttles imaging strategys. The ordinal recommendation recommended upgrading the imaging clay to provide at least(prenominal) three multi routine views of the space shuttles from liftoff to at least unharmed Rocket adept separation, and further recommended exploring the first step of taking special pictures and observations of the space shuttle during launch use ships and aircraft. Recommendation five pertained sp ecifically to the External Tank (ET) and the Thermal Protection System (TPS) imaging administrations examination.The CAIB recommended modifying one of the two on-board umbilical cameras in rove to downlink high-resolution images of the ET after separation, and further recommended that a similar constitution be put into place to downlink high-resolution images of the underside of the orbiters leading edge system and the forward prick of the TPS (Troxell, 2009). organizational refinement Communications procedures surrounded by managers and engineers at NASA were as well as investigated by the CAIB.The need to communicate efficaciously and efficiently surrounded by the individuals and organizations involved in the space shuttle program were frame to be paramount, inclined the complex and high level of engine room along with the blanket(a) risks involved. The CAIB effect that the original damage assessments contained whole uncertainties for a garland of reasons, includ ing management failures, communication breakdowns, inappropriate use of assessment beam of lights, and flawed applied science judgments.The CAIB in like manner determined that there were lapses in leadership and communication that made it very grueling for engineers and management to effect concerns and understand decisions. management failed to actively take over and analyze the possible damage caused by the foam strike. before the accident, flight managers had been under extreme blackjack from Congress and the familiar to maintain launch schedules, and they had not followed established procedures for clearing discrepant problems.Based on these and separate observations, the CAIB think that NASA was not a learning organization. Organizational learning is not one but several processes by which organizations seek to reform their performance by searching out the causes behind what they settle to be insufferable results (Mahler & Casa whitethornou, 2009). The CAIB con cluded that the organizational causes to the accident accommodate deficiencies in the couch condition structure and un endangerousguard monitoring systems, an softness to cope with sozzled external governmental and budgetary pressures, and an clogging organizational culture.System safe The CAIB effect that NASAs rubber program was deficient of achieving the level of guard necessary for the space shuttle program. As a result, the CAIB recommended that the base hit system at NASA be restructured to include the system galosh fundamentals. System base hit is the name given to the effort to make things as safe as is practical(a) by consistently using plan and management tools to identify, analyze, and control hazards (Stephans, 2004) throughout all phases of the life cycle.At the time of the investigation, NASAs description of system safety was as follows The optimum pointedness of risk management within the constraints of operative effectiveness, time, and cost r each through the practical coating of management and engineering principles throughout all phases of a program. It was a great definition but NASA did not follow or operate under these fundamentals which were be by the CAIB time and time again.They found that the system safety engineering and management was not nimble enough to cast off an impact on system design, and it was vague in the other safety disciplines and quarantined from mainstream engineering which prove extremely ineffective in regards to safety. They to a fault found that the space shuttle safety program had irrelevant roles, responsibilities, and guidance. Hazard abridgment The hazard analysis techniques used by NASA at the time of the accident were the nonstarter Modes and Effects analysis (FEMA) and the Fault manoeuvre Analysis (FTA).The CAIB found that the risk information and data from the hazard analyses were not communicated effectively nor could they find fair to middling application of a process , database, or careful analysis tool that took an integrated, systemic view of the inherent space shuttle system. come out Columbia Procedures at NASA Once the investigation into Space Shuttle Columbias accident was finished, NASA shut down all space shuttle missions until they felt their system safety and communication procedures where brought up to par.This space shuttle grounding lasted 905 days and at last ended on July 26th, 2005 when the Space Shuttle Discovery successfully flew the STS-114 mission. System Safety NASA took the recommendation of the CAIB and restructured their system safety program. The purpose of the new system safety program within NASA is to experience that the optimum degree of safety is achieved through management and engineering practices that minimize the number and magnitude of hazards in NASA systems.This is coupled with the application of system safety engineering analyses to attain and assess the temper and magnitude of risks so that they may be eliminated, reduced, or reliable depending on propose requirements, schedule, and cost. This purpose is reached through the application of management, scientific, and engineering principles during all phases of a system life cycle. The ultimate conclusion is to avoid loss of life or injury to personnel, damage to or loss of equipment or facilities, project or test failures, and undue motion-picture show to risk and untoward environmental effects.To date NASA has flown 19 separate space shuttle missions with no incidents under their new system safety program. NASAs space shuttle fleet is set to retire after just two final missions. Space Shuttle Discovery is expected to launch on November 1st, 2010 and Space Shuttle enterprisingness will launch no to begin with than February 26th, 2011. Post Columbia Improvements NASA spent $1. 4 billion in an effort to improve the space shuttle after the Columbia incident. The most noteworthy area of betterment was the External Tank.The bipod foam that caused the Columbia disaster was replaced with an electrical warmer to prevent ice from forming. Another noteworthy area of approach was too the alien Object rubble (FOD) procedures which improved safety. They withal added over speed of light tracking cameras to view launches as well as cameras mount on the External Tank and stiff Rocket Boosters. NASA also has two aircraft fit out with high-definition cameras which offer the whimsical perspective of a shuttle escape toward the viewer (Chien, 2006). every of NASAs improvements bet to support worked so far.In the years following Space Shuttle Columbias accident, NASA reinvented their society from the ground up and is now used as a model friendship that others look to for advice and operational information. Conclusion The Space Shuttle Columbia accident may or may not have been preventable. There are numerous things that could have gone otherwise that might have given the crew a contrasting fate, howe ver, the accident happened in the least evil manner possible. The astronauts were able to enjoy themselves the immaculate mission, complete indispensable mission experiments, and reach a finish many of them had worked toward their entire lives.They had no knowledge that the shuttle was change and their deaths were mercifully swift. Columbias re-entry cut over the U. S. made rubble retrieval far easier than if it had fall over the ocean. Because so much debris and information was recovered it was possible to determine exactly what happened without any shadow of a doubt. It will sure as shooting continuously be regrettable that the accident happened, but the fate of the Columbia crew could have been far worse. They will always been remembered as heroes.